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CONFLICT OF LA WS-Pnblic Policy Used To Apply Forum 
Law to Joint Bank Accounts of Foreign-Domiciliaries-
Wyatt v. Fulrath* 
The Duke and Duchess of Arion, nationals and domiciliaries of 
Spain, neither of whom had ever been to New York, deposited com-
munity property consisting of cash and securities in several New 
York banks. In establishing these accounts, the Duke and Duchess 
either expressly agreed in writing that the New York law of sur-
vivorship would apply to their accounts or signed standard bank 
survivorship forms which incorporated the survivorship laws of that 
state.1 After her husband's death, the Duchess made the entire 
amount on deposit in New York subject to her will. Following the 
Duchess' death and during probate of her will, plaintiff, as an an-
cillary administrator of the Duke's estate, arguing that Spanish 
community property law governed the rights to property of a hus-
band and wife and that it prohibited the separation of marital prop-
erty by means of survivorship accounts,2 brought suit against the 
Duchess' executor to establish claim to one-half of the property in 
the New York accounts. The action of the Supreme Court, Special 
and Trial Term,3 in dismissing the complaint on its merits was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division.4 On appeal to 
the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, three judges dis-
senting. New York courts may use "public policy" as the basis for 
applying their own laws to property placed in New York by mar-
ried foreigners who request that New York survivorship laws govern 
their property's future disposition.I• 
• 16 N.Y.2d 159, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 
principal case]. 
I. N.Y. BANKING I.Aw § Ul4(3), which was replaced in 1965 by N.Y. BANKING I.Aw 
§ 675, provides that a deposit of cash and securities made with any bank in the name 
of a depositor and any other person in a form to be paid or delivered to either, or 
the survivor of them, is to be considered property of such persons as joint tenants. 
The bank may deliver the deposit to either during the lifetime of both or to the 
survivor after the death of one of them. The section further states that the making 
of such a deposit would be prima facie evidence of the intention of both depositors 
to create a joint tenam.y and to vest title to the deposit in the survivor. 
2. Under Spanish law, all property acquired by either spouse during marriage is 
community property, excep~ for gifts and bequests from third persons. See C6mco 
CIVIL EsPANOL art. 1401 (Fisher transl., 4th ed. 1930). Upon the death of one spouse, 
one-half of the community property immediately vests in the survivor, and the other 
half becomes part of the e:;tate of the deceased spouse. See C601co CIVIL EsPANOL art. 
1407 (Fisher transl., 4th ed. 1930). The Code also prohibits the alteration of the com-
munity aspect of the marital property by means of interspousal gifts or contracts. See 
C6DIGO CIVIL EsPANOL arts. 1334, 1394 (Fisher transl., 4th ed. 1930). 
3. 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
4. 22 App. Div. 2d 853, 254 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964). 
5. A second contest was the right to funds which the Duke and Duchess had 
placed in London bank accounts and which the Duchess transferred to New York 
after the death of the Duke. The court returned this issue to the lower court, directing 
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When the various operative elements of a case have some con-
nection with a foreign jurisdiction as well as with the forum, and 
when the laws of these two jurisdictions conflict, it is necessary to 
determine which law is to govern the rights of the parties. The tra-
ditional choice of law rules which were designed to apply specific 
rules in particular categories of cases have been attacked by courts 
which are seeking to provide the forum with greater flexibility in 
its determination of the applicable choice of law.6 Indeed, the New 
York Court of Appeals has paced the attack, and has frequently set 
aside the established rules for being too mechanistic and too incon-
siderate of the relevant interests of the jurisdictions concemed.7 In 
the principal case, the Court of Appeals admitted that, under the 
traditional rules, the law of the domiciliary jurisdiction would gov-
it to determine and apply English conflict laws in deciding the ownership of these 
funds. For a discussion of the principal case, particularly in regard to this matter, 
see 66 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 796 (1966). 
6. When work on the Restatement of Conflict of Laws was commenced in 1923, 
Professor Joseph H. Beale's "vested rights" theory was widely accepted. According 
to Beale, rights and obligations were acquired in the jurisdiction where the critical 
events took place. To determine the jurisdiction to which they should be referred 
in their search for the rights and obligations, courts usually engage in a two·step 
process. First, a court will "characterize" the problem by ascertaining the area of law 
which the factual situation involves. This characterization will then automatically 
refer the court to one of the concerned jurisdictions by means of established choice of 
laws rules. For example, if a problem were characterized as one in tort, the established 
rule is to apply the law of the place of the injury, the lex loci delicti, for that is where 
the plaintiff's rights, if any, arose. See R.EsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 384 (1934). 
Likewise, if a case were characterized as one involving contracts, the controlling law 
would be of the place of contracting or of performance. See R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF 
LAws § 332 (1934). The "vested rights" theory has been avoided by courts seeking a 
more flexible method to solve the choice of law problem. See Fabricus v. Horgen, 4 
Iowa 17, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 
A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). 
7. Although the "vested rights," or lex loci, approach of the traditional choice of 
law rules had the benefit of being easily applied and providing certainty of result, the 
New York Court of Appeals felt that such an approach was too inflexible since it ig• 
nored the interests and policy considerations which jurisdictions other than that of 
the lex loci might have. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), for an application of the forum's law in a case brought by a 
passenger who was injured in an automobile accident in Ontario. The Ontario guest 
statute, which if applied would have precluded recovery, was not considered controlling 
since the fact that the accident occurred in Ontario was deemed fortuitous. Rather, 
forum law was applied since both the plaintiff-guest and defendant-driver were from 
New York. The court explained: 
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" may be achieved by giving con• 
trolling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship 
or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the 
specific issue raised in the litigation. 
Babcock v. Jackson, supra at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283. 
In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), the court of appeals dis-
regarded the usual lex loci rul.!S governing the choice of law in contract cases and 
proceeded to apply the law of the jurisdiction with which the facts were in most 
intimate contact. This has become known as the "grouping of contacts" or "center of 
gravity" choice of law method, and it permits the forum to weigh the underlying 
policies of each concerned jurisdiction. 
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em the respective rights of spouses to their marital personal prop-
erty, 8 even when the property is transferred to a jurisdiction other 
than the domiciliary jurisdiction.9 However, the coµrt was able to 
avoid these traditional rules by applying New York's "public pol-
icy," saying that it was "preferable that as to property which foreign 
owners are able to get here physically, and concerning which they 
request New York law to apply to their respective rights, when it 
actually gets here, that we should recognize their physical and legal 
submission of the property to our laws."10 
The difficulty in the principal case centers around the use of 
"public policy" to avoid the automatic results of the traditional 
choice of law rules without adequately discussing the reasons for this 
approach. New York courts had initially held that the "public pol-
icy" of the state consisted of no more than the totality of the statutes 
and the constitution,11 but this view was expanded to include ju-
dicial decisions.12 In the principal case, the Court of Appeals found 
the "public policy" governing the factual situation before it to be 
embodied in section 47 of the state's Decedent Estate Law, which 
provides that New York law will govern the testamentary disposition 
of property in New York owned by foreign domiciliaries who re-
quest that it so govern; Section 12-a of the Personal Property Law, 
which provides that the state will honor a foreign settlor's request 
that New York law determine the validity of a trust if either the 
8. See Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N.Y. 157 (1861); Matter of Mesa v. Hernandez, 172 App. 
Div. 467, 159 N.Y. Supp. 59 (1916), affd, 219 N.Y. 566, 114 N.E. 1069 (1916); REsrATE-
MENT, CONFUCT OF LAws § 290 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFUCT OF LAws § 124 (4th ed. 
1964); STUl\ffiERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 312 (3d ed. 1963). However, the 
spouses' respective interests in immovable marital property is traditionally deter-
mined by the law of the situs. See Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717 
(1852); REsrATEMENT, CoNFUCT OF LA.ws §§ 237-38 (1934); GOODRICH, op. cit. supra 
§ 122; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra at 342. 
9. Property which is held in community retains this characteristic when trans-
ferred to a separate-property, or common law, forum. See Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 202, 
49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); In re Kessler's Estate, 177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964); 
Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws 
§ 292 (1934). Similarly, property which is separate remains so after it is transferred to 
a community property state. See Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930); 
In re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P .2d I (1934); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 
336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912); Huff v. Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436 (1851); Brookman v. Durkee, 
46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 293 (1934). See 
generally DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943). 
Under the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, the situs of the bank accounts, 
which are intangible property, would be in Spain where the owners resided, and the 
property would not have acquired a new situs in New York. It is now generally 
recognized, however, that bank accounts can have a situs separate and distinct from 
the domicile of the owner. See Matter of Kugel, 192 Misc. 61, 78 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. 
1948). 
IO. Principal case at 173, 211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236. 
11. See Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407 (1893); Cross v. United States 
Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892); Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 
N.Y. 166 (1884). 
12. See People v. Hawkins, 157 N.Y. I, 51 N.E. 257 (1898). 
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trust res or trustee is in the state; and Hutchison v. Ross,13 in which 
the Court of Appeals noted that New York "public policy," as 
grounded in section 12-a of the Personal Property Law, dictated the 
use of the lex f ori in determining the validity of a trust whose res 
and trustee were in New York and whose settler manifested an 
intent that it be governed by New York law, even though the settlor 
and the beneficiaries were Canadian domiciliaries. Having found 
the "public policy," the court in the principal case asserted that the 
policy required application of New York's law whenever: (1) prop-
erty is placed in New York and (2) the owners intend New York law 
to govern the rights to this property. However, although the court 
indicated the sources of "public policy" and when "public policy" 
will be applied, it neither clearly defined this policy nor explained 
why it is sufficient to override the Spanish interest in preserving the 
community status of the property. Consequently, it is submitted 
that in the principal case the court's use of "public policy" to find 
the applicable law is as inflexible an approach as are the traditional 
choice of law rules. 
"Public policy" is a method which has been used by the courts 
in order to avoid the traditional choice of law rules,14 but it has 
normally been used only when the foreign law which would have 
been applied would have violated a strong moral conviction of the 
forum or resulted in what the forum could consider an extremely 
unjust decision.15 In Loucks v. Standard Oil of New York,16 Judge 
Cardozo explained that judges are not free to invoke "public policy" 
at their own pleasure or to suit their individual notions of expedi-
ency. The forum should refuse to enforce the foreign claims, he said, 
only if enforcement "would violate some fundamental principle of 
justice, some prevelant conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal."17 To be sure, mere variations in the 
foreign law are not sufficient to justify a state's rejection of the appli-
cable laws of a foreign state, where the foreign state has the greater 
interest and more signific<1-nt contacts with the case.18 Indeed, 
Cardozo's limitation on the use of "public policy" has received the 
widespread approval of commentators who fear that to permit a 
broader use of the doctrine would inevitably lead to a wholesale 
application of the laws of the forum and an abandonment of a 
13. 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933). 
14. See 3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 612.1 (1935); GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 
8, § 11; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 8, at 166. 
15. "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state 
the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." RE-
STA1EMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 612 (1934). (Emphasis added.) 
16. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
17. Id. at Ill, 120 K.E. at 202. 
18. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Holzer v. Deutsche Reichs-
bahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938). 
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thorough choice of law analysis which would include an examina• 
tion of the foreign state's interests.19 Moreover, traditionally, "pub-
lic policy" has been used in conflict of laws cases in a negative sense, 
that is, to prevent a result contrary to the forum's interests which 
would occur if foreign law were applied.20 New York courts, pre-
ferring to enforce rather than invalidate foreign claims, have been 
reluctant to invoke the "public policy" doctrine even in this nega-
tive sense.21 However, in the principal case, as in Hutchison, 
"public policy" was employed in an affirmative manner, that is, not 
to prevent the application of the Spanish community property law 
because it was inimical to the New York law, but rather to make 
certain that because of New York's policy, New York law would 
govern the rights of the parties without regard to Spanish law or 
interests.22 When so used, "public policy" substitutes itself for the 
usual and more involved choice of law analysis.23 
The dissent disagreed with the majority on the factual question 
of whether the Duke and Duchess intended to have New York law 
alter their marital property rights, and it criticized the majority's use 
of "public policy" without considering the interests of Spain. How-
ever, it advocated the use of the traditional rules which would have 
automatically applied the foreign law without considering the inter-
ests of New York.24 Thus the Court of Appeals was divided by 
19. See 2 RABEL, CONFUCT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 555.75 (2d ed. 1958); 
Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918); 
Paulsen 8: Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 969 
(1956). 
20. See CHEATHAM, GRISWOLD, REEsE & ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF I.Aw 
403-05 (5th ed. 1964); Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict 
of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940). 
21. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 
254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964) (gambling debts validly incurred elsewhere are enforceable in 
New York courts despite anti-gambling provisions in the New York Penal Law); 
Matter of May, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953) (New York recognizes marriage con-
tracted in another state even though it would be incestuous and void if performed in 
New York); Shea v. Shea, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945) (New York recognizes 
validity of common law marriage completed in another state). 
22. Indeed, it would appear that "public policy" could not be used here in its 
usual negative sense for a New York court held: "Community property laws are in 
no way repugnant to the public policy of New York." Chesny v. Chesny, 197 Misc. 
768, 771, 94 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1950), modified, 277 App. Div. 879, 98 N.Y.S.2d 
151 (1950). 
23. "[P]ublic policy" is one way to avoid the application of a choice of law rule 
which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of the forum, thus, is not to the 
content of the foreign law but to its own choice of law rule. Rather than to change 
or modify the supposedly applicable rule, the court may refuse on public policy 
grounds to apply the law to which the rule makes reference .•.• In such a view 
the "public policy" doctrine becomes a kind of choice of law principle, imprecise, 
uncertain of application, but nevertheless discharging a choice of law function. 
It is a way of saying, "In these circumstances this forum makes reference to its 
internal law rather than to ,the law of another state to which our 'normal' choice 
of law would direct us." 
Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 19, at 981. 
24. Principal case at 176, 2ll N.E.2d at 641, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 238-39. 
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extreme views, the majority calling for an application of the lex fori 
and the minority invoking the laws of Spain under the traditional 
rules, with neither side considering the interests of the opposing 
jurisdiction. 
In light of the trend in conflict of laws toward a more flexible 
approach in choosing the applicable law,25 the court might have 
reached the same result"by characterizing the problem in the prin-
cipal case as one involving a marital contract. Such a classification 
could have readily followed from the trial court's finding that the 
joint account agreements served as express interspousal contracts to 
alter marital property rights.26 Since the validity of an interspousal 
agreement concerning marital property rights is to be determined 
by the same rules that determine the validity of any other contract,27 
the Court of Appeals would thus have been able to apply the flexible 
"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory developed 
earlier by the same court in Auten v. A uten.28 With the application 
of such a theory, "public policy" would not be used as a tool to 
apply mechanically the forum's law but, rather, would be consid-
ered as one of the many interests which the court would weigh in 
making its choice of law. 
In determining which jurisdiction has the most significant con-
tacts, the court should consider the fact that New York is the situs 
of the joint accounts and that the couple intended to have the 
property governed by New York law. The matter of intent is ex-
tremely important since courts will usually give effect to the justi-
fiable expectations of the parties so long as there is a reasonable 
connection between the selected jurisdiction and the parties.29 Also 
relevant is the fact that the "public policy of New York appears to 
be one of encouragement to non-residents to do business with New 
York banks."30 On the other hand, the court should take note of the 
fact that Spain's ancient community property system is designed to 
give economic stability to the family unit,31 and the application of 
New York law would not only thwart the Spanish policy, which is 
historically grounded in deep-seated notions of family obligation, 
but it would also allow interspousal agreements to alter interests in 
marital property at the expense of other members of the family. 
25. See note 7 supra. 
26. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 1017, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
27. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 8, § 125. 
28. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). See discussion of this case at note 7 supra. 
29. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFUCT OF LAWS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) 
provides that the validity of a contract is determined by the local law of the state with 
which the contract has its most significant relationship and the state of the most 
significant relationship is the state chosen by the parties. 
30. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 1016, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 491 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
31. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion considered the fact that articles 
806-08 of the Spanish Civil Code provide that parents must leave two-thirds of their 
individual estates to their descendants as "forced heirs." 
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Moreover, Spanish creditors undoubtedly rely upon the rights which 
these family members would normally have. Also, although courts 
may justifiably be influenced in their choice of law by the intentions 
and expectations of the parties, such expectations are only one of 
many considerations and are not necessarily controlling. The 
Restatement acknowledges that a contract's validity is generally de-
termined by the chosen law, but it provides an exception to this rule 
when "application of the chosen law would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of the state which would be the state of the governing 
law in the absence of an effective choice by the parties."32 Providing 
for the individual spouse's and the heirs' financial security by means 
of the community property arrangement is clearly a fundamental 
policy of Spain which would be circumvented if the parties' inten-
tion to apply New York law were to prevail. To be sure, the reso-
lution of the question as to which of the jurisdictions has the most 
compelling interests is no simple task, but to avoid the question by 
adopting a "public policy" approach, as did the court in the principal 
case, does nothing but revert to a mechanistic approach which the 
New York courts have sought to avoid. 
ll2. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § ll32a(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). 
